, and the references cited therein.) Although studies of labor supply model the simultaneity of the participation-hours worked decision (Heckman (1974) ), the relation of employment decisions to housing~ and other good consumption has not been thoroughly examined. Some previous research examines labor supply decisions within the framework of consumer demand systems, but either uses aggregate data or does not focus on housing consumption as one of the "other goods." (See Abbott and Ashenfelter (1976), Wales and Woodland (1976, 1977) , and Bamett (1981).) Only Wales (1978) and Kohlhase (1982) have used micro data to examine labor and housing decisions within a consumer demand theory framework. The present work extends this line of analysis to combine aspects of urban and labor research and emphasizes the comparisons of results across demographic groups.
In order to incorporate these ideas, household decision models are presented in the framework of consumer demand systems. Section II examines the simultaneity of household decision making while accounting for the locational aspects of the consumer choice problem. Section III describes the data and estimation of linear translog (LTL) demand systems for seven demographic groups differentiated by marital status, employment status and presence of children. In section IV results are discussed; it is found that the seven demographic groups significantly differ in their response to changes in prices and income. The implication of the findings are discussed in the conclusion, section V.
II. Problem Definition
Household decision models are developed in which urban households choose housing, hours of leisure and other goods given workplace-residence separation. Commuting costs are explicitly treated as a fixed cost (Cogan, 1981) of market work. Linear translog demand systems are specified for seven demographic groups. The estimation of these systems allows the comparison of behavior across demographic groups within the theoretically consistent framework of consumer demand systems. 4 It is assumed that the demographic profile of the urban area is exogenously determined. The city is composed of households of seven demographic types: unmarried males, unmarried females with children, childless unmarried females, traditional (only the male head is employed) couples, traditional families with children, two-earner couples and two-earner families with children. Moreover, it is assumed that the participation decision is given and that at least one member of the household is employed, workplace is fixed and residence ring (radius of a given distance from the workplace) is fixed.
Households choose their annual consumption of housing, goods and services, and leisure of the wage earners' by maximizing a household quasiconcave utility function.6 One-earner households maximize U= U(Lh, r, x)
(1) 4 An alternative methodology for examining the impacts of demographic variables on consumer choice is to incorporate demographic variables explicitly into the demand equations by use of scaling or translating certain parameters of the demand system (Pollak and Wales, 1980) . The present approach is more general; in effect all parameters are assumed to be functions of demographic variables. Moreover, Barnes and Gillingham (1981) reject demographic scaling and translating in favor of estimating separate demand systems for each subgroup.
5 Implicit in the analysis is the assumption that households continuously consume their temporal equilibrium housing services and leisure hours. The temporal equilibrium is defined with respect to the households' current economic and demographic characteristics. Results are to be interpreted as long-run responses by the demographic groups.
Dynamic models of labor supply are fairly well-developed in the literature (Killingsworth, 1983) , however dynamic models of housing demand are in their infancy (pioneered by Houthakker and Taylor, 1970; their lack deplored by Mayo, 1981) . It is beyond the scope of this paper to explicitly model the dynamics of the joint decisions. Moreover, data set limitations made only one year available with a detailed spouse interview, a necessary element in the comparison of one-and two-earner households. 6 household utility-household budget constraint model is assumed here. The approach differs from other approaches to household behavior such as the individual utility-household budget and related bargaining models (see Killingsworth (1983) and cited references). Two important areas of difference concern the effects of changes in other's wage and non-wage income on individual leisure hours. In the household utility model the (compensated) cross-substitution effects of wage changes of either spouse are equal but of indeterminant signs. However, in the individual utility approach the indirect income effects are not necessarily equal, and if leisure is normal, are negative. Secondly, non-wage income changes are "public goods" in the household utility model, but can be individualspecific in the latter two approaches. 
The time constraints in equations (4) and (5) involve three uses of time: leisure, employment and commuting (which fixes residential location). Ideally it would be of interest to develop an urban model which would simultaneously clear land and labor markets (Madden (1980) and Madden and White (1980) ); the attempt to endogenize all three uses of time greatly complicates the analysis and will not be attempted here.8 To simplify the analysis of the time allocation problem, one of the three uses of time can be fixed and the other two determined simultaneously. For example, White (1977) fixes work hours in order to compute bid rent functions for one-and two-earner households. In contrast, this study fixes commuting hours since labor supply issues are of major concern.
By performing the constrained maximization of equations (1) and (2), demand equations for housing, leisure, and the composite good can be derived in terms of full-income and prices. In what follows, a translog indirect utility function is specified, yielding the linear translog (LTL) demand system.9
The LTL system is derived from the generalized translog indirect utility function ( The 1976 wave provides a unique opportunity to analyze the two-earner households since only in that wave were separate head and spouse interviews obtained. Because this study examines urban phenomena, the national random subsample is further limited to those families living less than 30 miles from a city of 50,000 or more. To be included in the analysis, the earner must have reported wage, distance to work, and housing data.
Hence, the final sample sizes range from 94 for unmarried females to 397 for traditional families with children (appendix table Al).
Two variables are constructed from the data, annual price-per-room and annual money-cost of commuting. Price-per-room for renters is simply annual rent divided by the number of rooms. For homeowners, reported house value is assumed to reflect capitalized maintenance, property tax, other expenditures, and location factors and is converted to a flow value by application of the present value formula. Since the sample is from 1976, a 10% interest rate is used to obtain imputed rent10 from the present market value of the home. The annual money cost of commuting (dth, dt,) is derived from reported weeks worked, distance to work, and mode of travel. Likelihood ratio tests show the demographic groups to have different tastes. These tests allow differentiation only among the subgroups whose behavior has been estimated by the same model with the same number of parameters.'3 For example, to test if all five one-earner subgroups really belong in a single category, the maintained hypothesis is that all parameters are the same over the five one-earner subgroups, and the alternative hypothesis is that each subgroup has unique tastes. The likelihood function under the maintained hypothesis is estimated by pooling all one-earner observations. The likelihood function under the alternative hypothesis is the joint density of the likelihood function obtained by estimating the subgroups individually. x2 values for one-earner and two-earner models are greater than their corresponding table values at the 0.005 significance level. Thus, within the class of one-earner households, the five subgroups defined by sex, marital status, and presence of children have significantly different tastes. Furthermore, within the class of the two-earner households, the presence of children does significantly alter tastes.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Further support for subgroup uniqueness is provided in tables 1 and 2 where linearized standard errors"4 for the elasticities are provided. Bands of confidence around each elasticity show most housing and total income elasticities to be unique. Thus different demographic groups do behave differently in today's urban markets.
13 See Deaton (1978) for suggestions on how to test nonnested models. The approach seems to be inappropriate for testing differences in parameters between one-earner and twoearner subgroups. bFull income elasticity multiplied by the ratio of total family income to full income. Tables 1 and 2 
IV. Results

A. Employment
B. Housing
The income elasticities of housing in table 2 offer insight into the debate in the empirical literature on housing demand.18 The inelastic results found here support the conclusion by Polinsky (1977) and Polinsky and Elwood (1979) that micro studies are likely to yield income elasticities less than one. However, the money income elasticities of housing reported here are generally lower than those found in other micro data studies (see also Mayo, 1981) . This may occur because the new labor supply patterns, especially of women, profoundly impact household behavior. This study is pioneering in that it models the labor-housing decision jointly while most other studies use single equations to study only housing demand. Based on single equation estimates, Polinsky and Elwood (1979) report the income elasticity of housing to be about 0.8. The only other study jointly estimating labor supply and housing demand, Wales (1978) , reports a money income elasticity of 0.7 for oneearner households who own homes.
The values of money income elasticities of housing do not support theoretical predictions often found in the urban economics literature. Muth (1969) and other urban economists maintain that the income elasticity of housing is about or slightly greater than one. This study finds that most money income elasticities are less than 0.5. Another hypothesis of urban economics is that the rich live further out from the central business district because they have more elastic income responses. In this sample, the two-earner families with children (and most likely to live in the suburbs) average the highest money income yet have, the second smallest money income elasticity of housing.
Although the quantity demanded of housing is relatively price inelastic for all demographic groups, the elasticities differ between the groups and range from -0.03 to -0.565. The own price elasticities of housing reported here are generally smaller than those reported in previous studies. Polinsky (1977) concludes that the price elasticity of housing is -0.75. This is too high by half when the labor supply response is modelled jointly. Wales (1978) finds the own price elasticity of housing for one-earner families to be -0.18, which is in the range of elasticities found here.
The importance of modelling labor supply and housing demand jointly is shown by the large cross-price elasticities between housing and leisure. The positive elasticities range from 0.057 to 0.437 and indicate that housing and leisure hours are gross substitutes, and thus that housing and work hours are gross complements. As the wage earned in the labor market rises so does housing consumption. From examination of the elasticities for two-earner households, it appears that housing consumption is more sensitive to the increased wage of the head than of his spouse. Elasticities 16 The total income elasticity defined by Cain and Watts (1973) equals the conventionally measured income elasticity weighted by the fraction that earnings is of the income variable used. In practice, the elasticities are evaluated at the means so the above reduces to weighting the income derivative by the wage rate.
17 Atrostic (1982, p. 436) argues that the total income elasticity is really not independent of the income measure used since parameters estimated are sensitive to the measure of income.
18 To facilitate comparisons with results from single-equation housing demand studies, the money income elasticity is computed by multiplying the full-income elasticity by the ratio of family money income to full-income.
for the male heads in two-earner families with children and childless families are 0.153 and 0.248, respectively, while elasticities for their spouses are 0.057 and 0.135.
V. Conclusion
Two major contentions of this research are that (1) decisions regarding work hours and housing consumption are interdependent choices and (2) responses to market signals differ significantly by demographic group. The analysis in sections III and IV supports these contentions. Moreover, the analysis is accomplished within a theoretically consistent framework that accounts for locational aspects of the consumer choice problem.
The consumer demand system approach specifically accounts for the jointness of labor supply and housing demand. Results are superior to single equation studies of either labor supply or housing demand which ignore leisure-consumption tradeoffs. The findings of significant correlations between residuals of the demand equations show that household decisions regarding labor supply and housing demand are not separable but feed back upon each other. Further support is demonstrated by the significant cross-price elasticities of housing with respect to wages.
Modelling the joint decisions yields new insight into the different behavior of the seven demographic groups. The presence of children and the presence of an additional earner are associated with smaller responses to changes in prices and income. Single males, the least duty-bound group, are the most responsive to market signals. Market earners in all demographic groups would decrease work effort if nonwage income would increase, but the groups are split over the effect of wages on work effort. One significant finding is that women in female-headed households react differently to increases in wages than women in two-earner households. Married women would decrease their work effort if their wage rose, while unmarried women would increase their market hours. In short, the housing and labor market behavior of oneearner households significantly differs from that of two-earner households.
By relating implications of the changing demographic structure to changing work and housing patterns, important insights can be gained into the dynamic housing and labor markets of today's cities. Aggregate studies which ignore these differences are likely to misrepresent overall responses in labor and housing markets. Policy makers must be sensitive to the different responses to market signals by different demographic groups. The theoretically consistent framework presented here provides a methodology for analyzing the differences in market behavior.
Important future research will be to specifically model the dynamic adjustments experienced by households. Not only should consumption be made dynamic along such lines as habit formation or stock adjustment models, but the relation of demographic status to labor supply and housing demand should by explicitly treated. A possible framework would be to treat divorce as an unanticipated shock and the birth of children as a planned change in household status. The present research represents a first step toward understanding the complexities of family labor and housing decisions.
